Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/619

 as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which, though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another, and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the People themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his reëlection to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the Convention; which is, that the People of each State shall choose a number of persons as Electors, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of such State in the National Government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the National Government; and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes, will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates, who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the