Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/590

 [From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788.]

THE FŒDERALIST. No. LXIII.



T is a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most unexceptionable Articles in it.

The second Section gives power to the President, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, ."

The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. The Convention appears to have been attentive to both these points; they have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of Electors, to be deputed by the People for that express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of Senators to the State Legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the People in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often 