Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/558

 have been, to have submitted in this instance to an inconvenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity urges, nor any greater good invites.

It may be easily discerned, also that the National Government would run a much greater risk, from a power in the State Legislatures over the elections of its House of Representatives, than from their power of appointing the members of its Senate. The Senators are to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two Senators; a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of these circumstances would be, that a temporary combination of a few States, to intermit the appointment of Senators, could neither annul the existence, nor impair the activity of the body; and it is not from a general and permanent combination of the States, that we can have anything to fear. The first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members of a few of the State Legislatures: the last would suppose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the People; which will, either never exist at all, or will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the General Government to the advancement of their happiness; in which event, no good citizen could desire its continuance.

But with regard to the Fœderal House of Representatives, there is intended to be a general election of members once in two years. If the State Legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period of making them would be a delicate crisis in the National situation; which might issue in a dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of