Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/447

 republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a Government; and consequently, that the Fœderal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State, as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought in the latter case to protect the local magistracy, ought not the Fœderal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State Constitutions, which are so interwoven with the Fœderal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one, without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a Fœderal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of Government. It will be much better, that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.

Is it true, that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican Governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine, that in a trial of actual force, victory may be