Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/445

 against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence."

In a Confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending Government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a Union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist, that the forms of Government under which the compact was entered into, should be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a Fœderal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the Confederate republic of Germany," says Author:Montesquieu, "consists of free Cities and petty States, subject to different Princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece was undone," he adds, "as soon as the King of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form of the new Confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State Governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the General Government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of