Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/340

 " to the purposes of the local administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the happiness of the People. It is, therefore, as necessary that the State Governments should be able to command the means of supplying their wants, as that the National Government should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in the latter might, and probably would in time, deprive the former of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the National Legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become the supreme law of the land; as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be  for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it; the National Government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects, upon the pretence of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing this, in order to give efficacy to the National revenues: And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of Fœderal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State Governments."

This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition of usurpation in the National Government: at other times, it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpations of the Fœderal Government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleasure, till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn,