Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/327

 them be exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its authority, which are objected to a Government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able to support the Fœderal authority, than in the case of a general Union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one Government for all the States, or different Governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community, and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them, which amount to insurrections and rebellions.

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say, that the whole power of the proposed Government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the People. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the People, which is attainable in civil society.

If the representatives of the People betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of Government; and which, against the usurpations of the National rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual State. In a single State, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels,