Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/878

 THE BICHUOND. 86S �had f ull knowledge of all the facts out of which danger arose, but the danger itself was not pointed out to him. O'Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 427. The correct rule as to defendant's liability was announced at the trial, and as to the damages the amouut is not so large as to challenge the attention of the court. To one in plaintiff's situation the sum is considerable, without doubt, but the injury was great and the suffering intense. It is impossible to say the jury acted from prejudice or passion, or that they passed the limita of fair discretion on the evidence. The motion for a new trial wili be denied. ���The Eichmond.' �(CHreuit Court, E. D. Louim'ana. June, 1881.) �1. Rbousation. �It is not a good cause of challenge that a judge bas formerly been of counsol for one of the parties In a different cause. �BiiLiNGS, D. J. A motion bas been liiade that I should decline to Bit in this cause because I have been of counsel. The doctrine oJ recusation of judges is of continental origin. According to the la^s of Great Britain it has been unknown sinco before Blackstone's time According to the law which prevails upon the continent, and at declared in the Code of France, a judge is recusable if he has given counsel, pleaded, or written of the controversy, has previously acted as judge or arbitrator, or defrayed the expenses of the suit, deposed as a witn6ss, etc. But at the common law as it prevailed in England, and was adopted by the people of the United States, there could be ijc challenge or recusation of judges on the ground that the judge had been of counsel. See Coke, Litt. 294; 2 Bro. Civ. & Adm. Law, 369 ; 3 Bl. Corn. 361 ; Lyon v. State Bank, 1 Stewart, 442. �This leaves nothing to be considered except the United Statea statutes. Of these there are two. The first, which is found in the Revised Statutes, § 601, applies only to causes pending in the district courts, The last, found in the Revised Statutes, § 615, authorizes and requires the court, on the application of either party, to transfer a cause to another circuit court. There could be no pretext that the first statute applied. It would dispose of the second statute to say that this is not an application to transfer to another court. In Spen- cer V. Lapsley, 20 How: 266, it is settled that the inability was to bf ��� �