Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/865

 850 FEDERAL REPORTER. �tion, "wonla absorb the whole f and ; and Jackson does not question the lien of ButleV's judgment, or his rigiit to bo paid out of the pro- ceeds of sale. The question upon which the case turns is whtther a judgment against a partnership, for a partnership debt, entered by confession of the firm, and at the suggestion of all the partners, is a lien against the partnership real estate. The register held that it was not, and he awarded the fund to the assignee in bankruptey. The decision of the register rests exclusively upon the assumption that partnership real estate is personalty, and therefore not the subjcct of a judgment lien. But the doctrine that partnership real estate is to be treated as personalty is not to be pushed too far. Eeal estate brought into a firm as stock is not converted absolutely and for all purposes. The conversion manifestly has its limitatipns. For ex- ample: partnership real estate unquestionably is governed by the statute of frauds. Again, to pass the title each partner is required to join in the oonveyance. Story, Part. § 94 ; Parsons, Part. § 377. �I suppose no one would seriously maintain that on an execution against a firm a constable .oould seize and sell their real estate. It was held in Fo^ter's Appeal, 74 Pa. St. 391, that after payment of the firm debts and the advances made by the surviving partner, the remaining share of a deceased partner in partnership real estate passed, not to his personal representatives, but to the widow and heirs. Conversion of partnership real estate is allowed to secure, in the interest of the partners themaelves, the payment of the firm debts and advances made by the partners respectively. Id. Therefore, the true doctrine, as I conceive, is that in so far as may be necessary to attain those ends, partnership real estate is to be treated as person- alty, but for every other purpose it remains real estate, and is subject to the principles and laws applicable to that species of property. Why, then, is partnership real estate not bound by the lien of a judgment against the partnership for a partnership debt, especially where such judgment is entered by confession of the firm and at the instance of all the partners ? From a very early period it has been the settled law of Pennsylvania that a judgment is a lien on every kind of right, — on every sort of beneficiai interest, — in real estate, vested in the debtor at the time of the judgment. Caskhuff v. Anderson, 3 Binn. 9 ; iroubat & H. §§ 58, 778; Price, Liens, 277. �The general creditors of a firm are preferred in the distribution of firm assets wholly by virtue of the equities of the partners, and not on aecount of any equities of their own. They themselves have no lien upon the partnership property. What right, therefore, have they. ��� �