Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/696

 LEATHBRS V. AIKEN. 6S1 �the same as though the defendant, Aiken, were not interposed, and the city of New Orleans, through its council, had simply passed an ordinance fixing the rate of wharfage dues, and directed in the same ordinance the disposition of the fund collected. �And now we have only to determine whether such an ordinance, with the rates as fixed, is obnoxious to the constitution and laws of the United States. �The authorities so fully cited in this case show exactly what a municipal corporation may exact from ships aud water-craft landing at the wharves and landings constructed or Owned by the corporation for the use and accommodation of such ships and water-craft. It cannot exact a charge for entering or leaving the port, or reuiaining ih'erein. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 ; Alexander v. Rail- road Co. 3 Strobhart, 594. It cannot lovy a tax on vessels and water- craft entering its port and using the wharves and landings, for the benefit of the general revenue of such corporation. Packet Co.\. Keohik, 95 U. S. 80; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, i: Dill. 10» But a municipal corporation owning improved wharves and other artificial means, which it maintains at its own cost for the benefit bf thqse engaged in commerce upon the public navigable waters of the United States, may charge and collect from parties using its wharves such reasonable fees as will fairly remunerate it for the use of its property. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, Id, 430; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, supra; Cannon v. New Orleans, supra; Packet Co. V St. Louis, supra. �That such fees are regulated by the tonnage of the vessel will not constitute them a tonnage tax in the meaning of paragraph 3, § 10, of art. 1, constitution of the United States. Packet Co, v. Keokuk, supra; Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419. �From these propositions, so well sustained by authority, the follow- ing are legitimate corollaries : �No charges can be made on vessels landing at wharves of a municipal cor- poration for facilities not furnished. �The commerce of this year cannofc be taxed to furnish facilities for the nexfc year. �It Is immaterial what disposition is made of the funds collected, except as showing what the collection is based on. �No charges can be made on the promise to furnish facilities to commerce. �Applying these propositions and principles to the case under coh- sideration, what do we find? The complainant, with his boafs, uses the wharves and levees, between Girod and St. Louis streets, on the ��� �