Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/691

 676 FEDBEAL EBPORTBB. �tution, exeepi for taxes and the purchase moneyof land claimed as a liomestead. I am inclined to think that this constitutional provision was intended to apply only to debts arising in the relation of indi- vidual debtor and creditor, and did not contemplate debts due to the state or the United States. �I am not aware of any decision of the state supreme court upor this subject, and.I wili not express a decided opinion as to how far these constitutional exemptions apply to debts due to the state. I fully recognize the doctrine that the federal courts are bound to accept as correct the decisions of the state courts upon all questions arising under the state constitution and laws, when no question of national rights and authority is involved. �In the course of my argument I feel that I can with propriety express the inclination of my opinion, as, from observation and expe- rience, I am familiar with the history of the situation, condition, and feelings of the people of the state, and the purposes they had in view at the time they f ormed and adopted the state constitution of 1868. They had just emerged froin a disastrous civil war, which had resulted in the loss of most of their property, and they were greatly embarrassed by indebtedness to individual ereditors, and they desired to secure their homestead and household eiiects, which were to them neces- saries of life, from the ruinous consequences of sale under execu- tion. Previous to the adoption of the constitution varions statutes had been passed by the legislature of the state to stay proceedings in the courts, and to postpone sales of property under executions upon judgments which had been or might be obtained. �In interpreting and construing this article of the constitution I think that I can make the reasonable inference that the intent of the people, in the exercise of their rights of sovereignty in framing their organic laws, was permanently to secure their homes and the necessaries of life against the eager grasp of individual ereditors. This intent is made still more manifest by the "iniform course of subsequent legislation upon this subject, as legislative action is generally an index of popular feeling and sentiment. There is a striking analogy and generally an entire harmony between the rules of interpretation of constitutions and those of statutes. The first and fundamental rule in relation to the interpretation of all instru- ments applies to a constitution; that is, to construe them aceording to the sense of the terms and the intention of the parties. Potter'b Dwarris, 655. �In considering the language of the constitution, the condition of ��� �