Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/644

 KBBP V. INDIANAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS R. CO. 629 �his cause of action may be against one or both of the defendants, although he will ultimately be allowed to receive compensation only once. �If the plaintif! is entitled to recover, the amount of damages to be allowed must be sufficient to compensate him for the amount of expenditures and losses by him sustained in consequence of such injury, taking also into consideration the estent of his injuries, the sufferings by him undergone therefrom, and the effect of the acci- dent on his general health. �The jury, tbrough their foreman, informed the court that theyhad agreed upon damages, and wished "to know whether a judgment against both companies will hold, or can it be assessed against one through the negligence of its agents." �Teeat, D. .t. If each company is at fault, tho samo amount of damages should be rendered against each. �The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and awarded him $7,500 damages against each defendant, aild the court ordered that the sat- isfaction of the judgment in one case should operate as a satisfaction in both. �Note. It scems clear that the questions of law arising upon the foregoing facts were, on the whole, correctly put to the jury by the learned and experi- eneed judge who presided at the trial, and with the terseness and brevity which is his habit. �1. In the first place, assurai ng that the plaintiff was injured through some faillire or fault in the means of transportation employed in carrying him from East St. Louis to St. Louis, there is no doubt of the liability of the Indianap- olis & St. Louis Kailway Company; for his contract was with this company. The recognized American doctrine with reference to the contract for the car- nage of passengers which is evidenced by the ordinary railway coupon ticket is, that it is a distinct contract with each carrier who, under it, undertakes the service of carrying the purchaserof the ticket. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fahey, 52 m. 81 \Kessler v. New York, etc., R. Co. 61 M". Y. 538 ; Milnor v. New York, etc., R. Co. 53 N. Y. ^Q'a;Knight v.PoHland, etc...R. Co. 56 Me. 234:;JSroofc v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 15 Mich. 332. The prineiple on which the American courts proeeed in so holding is, that the company, which sells the coupon ticket over its own and Connecting roads, acts as the agent of the Connecting companies for the purposeof making the contract of earriage over their roads. In this respect the Bnglish courts difler from the American. The former courts hold that such a contract is a contract with the first carrier — the carrier who sells the ticket, only; and that there is no privity betvveen the passenger r.ad ��� �