Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/366

 BUELL V. CINCINNATI. BFFINGHAM & QUINOI CONST. 00 851 ���BuELL and others v. Cincinnati, Bbtinqham & Quincy Construction �Co. and others. . �{Oireuit Court, 8. D. IlUnois. November, 1881.) �1. Rbmoval of Causes — Recbiveks — Contractoes. �Wliere a receiver who haa been appointed by a state court in the interest of the creditors of a construction company proceeds with the work of construcT tion by entering into contracts, etc., the fact that a coi^troversy anses between him and a contracter, or between a contraetpr and other claimants of a com- mon fund, does not entitle the contracter to removo the cause to a federal court, especially after the state court has proceedcd, without objection, to adjn- dicate upon the rights of the parties. �Motion at chambers, by "William Sturges, tofile a transcript of the Btate court and to docket the cause in this court. '< Mr. Cooper and Mr. Kales, for Sturges. �J. G: Black,x&<ieiv&r,pro se. �Dent e Black, for receiver and other creditors. �Mr. Callaghan, for creditors. �Dbummond, C. J. The object of the motion is to obtain the opinion of this court upon the question of jurisdiction made in the case. The bill was originally flled by some creditors of the con- struction company in the circuit court of Crawford county, in this state. The construction company had made a contract for build- ing a railroad, and the bill was in the nature of a creditors' bill for the protection of the interests of the plaintiffs. A receiver was appointed by the state court and was authorized to go on and complete the construction of the road undertaken by the company. <31aiming to proceed in pursuance of the authority thus conferred on him, the receiver made the contract in which Mr. Sturges was interested. If this were a question growing out of an ordinary application made to the state court by a claimant of the construction company for the protection of his rights, and asking that the property in its custody might be made available for his claim, in whole or in part, and the claim had originated entirely independent of any action of the state court, possibly there might bo some pretence, if the ditizenship of the parties justified it, that the cause might be re- moved. But this is a case where the only right which exists is by virtue of the action of the state court. The receiver of the state court, in a suit pending there, was authorized to perform certain acts; to employ men and to make contracts involving the construc- tion of a railroad. In the ordinary case of a receiver appointed by the court to operate a railroad he may employ agents-^as a superin- ��� �