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 20 FEDERAL REPORTER. �(unreported ;) Ranlett v. Collector, U. S. C. C. at New Orleans, Jan- uary 26, 1881, (unreported.) �John K. Valentine, U. S. Dist. Atty., for defendant, cited U. S. v. Kid, e Cranch, 1 ; U. S. v. Potts, 5 Cranch, 286 ; U. S. v. Sarchet, Gil- pin, 273; Bruce v. Murphy, 10 Blatchf. 230; Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 257; Leng v. Murphy, U. S. C. C. at New York, April 9, 1874, (unreported;) Ranlett v. Collector, U. S. C. C. at New Orleans, January 26, 1881, (unreported.) �McKennan, c. J., (charning jury.) The plaintiff imported into the port of Philadelphia, in several vessels, a considerable quantity of iron, invoieed as cotton ties. That iron was treated by the collector of the port of Philadelphia, who is the defendant in this case, as hoop iron, was classified as such, and he exacted from the plaintiff the duty which is imposed upon hoop iron. The plaintiff paid that duty under protest, and took the necessary steps to enable him to bring a suit for the recovery of the excess of duty, if an excess of duty was charged by the collector. The United States having classified this arti- cle differently from the invoice designation of it, and imposed a higher duty upon it than it would otherwise have been subjected to, the bur- den of proof is upon the United States to satisfy you that there has been a proper classification of this article by the collector, and that the rate of duty imposed by law only was exacted by him. What, then, is the proper classification of the article in question, so as to ascertain the duty to be imposed by law ? As I have already re- marked, it was classified as hoop iron under this clause of the tariff act of the thirtieth of June, 1864 : "Ail band, hoop, and scroll iron from one-half to six inches wide, under one-eighth of an inch in thick- ness, and not thinner than No. 20 wire gauge, one and one-half cents per pound." �Now, we must, in the first place, determine what is the meaning of the language of that act; and here I may say that the words em- ployed in all laws are to be received in their common, popular signi- fication. Thus interpreting this act there can be no doubt as to the meaning of these terms, "all hoop iron." It is not certainly confined to hoop iron of any particular length, but it is to be classified accord- ing to its character — whether it is hoop iron or not — irrespective of its length. It is claimed here, however, that this act has not that com- prehensive signification and meaning, but that these words have a special and restricted commercial sense, in which sense it is to be presumed they were used by congress. Now, it is a rule of construc- tion undoubtedly that, where terms employed in an act of congress ��� �