Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/290

 BBOWK V. THE JEFFEBSON GOUNTI NAT. BANK. 275 �reference is intended to be to such objections in respect to evidence as are noted in the course of the taking of evidence. But many objections are insisted on by the defendant which do not appear in the record, being taken under a stipulation entered in the record "that all the evidence be taken, reserving the right to object, save as to form of question to any or all of the same, upon the hearing of the cause, with like effect as if the specifie objections had been stated and noted by the examiner at the time the evidence was offered." The evidence of H. V. Cadwell, direct and cross, taken in bankruptcy, ■was admitted by stipulation ; the stipulation as to the direct, or that for the plaintiff, being that objections to each and every part of it are reserved "until the hearing of the cause by consent of the respective counsel," and the stipulation as to the cross, or that for the defendant, being that all objections are "reserved until the hearing of the cause, save as to form of question." �I am furnished with a copy of the printed brief presented by the counsel for the defendant to the district court, in which his objec- tions in respect to the evidence are set forth and numbered. Those objections are now insisted on by the defendant. It is not clear how far they can be considered on appeal, there being no disposition made of them by the district court by any order or decree. But the plain- tiff's counsel, in his brief in this court, refers to the objections to evidence taken by the defendant as if they were properly before this court, and therefore I proceed to dispose of them by their numbers ; and a provision may be inserted in the decree disposing of them. It is not entirely clear what the district court would, in an order, have excluded as being "advice given by the attorneys to their clients." Whatever any such order excluded would not corne up for review in an appeal by the defendant. A.s it is, I shall dispose of the objec- sions on the theory that none of them were allowed by the district court, as there is no order allowing any of them. �(1) Evidence as to the assignment was competent, as part of the history of the case, and throwing light on the iiitent of the debtors in respect to the judgments of the bank and on the question of the insolvency of the debtors. �(2) Evidence that McCartin & Williams drew the assignment was compe- tent, as showing their knowledge of the insolvency of the debtors. �(3) Evidence that McCartin & Williams appeared for the debtors on the first of May, in the bankruptcy proceedings, was competent, as throwing light on their previous action in thwarting, in eo-operation with the debtors, all other creditors but the bank. �(4) For the reasons before given I think the fact that McCartin & Will- iams, after the suits were brought, advised H. V. Cadwell to answer the ��� �