Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 9.djvu/152

Rh to deny the receipt of the cotton when the bill of lading has passed into the hands of an innocent party, and should be held precisely as if it had received the cotton and failed to deliver it to the plaintiffs. I doubt whether a factor and his principal occupy such a relation to each other in their dealings as will justify either in saying of their common or mutual carrier that he is the carrier for the other, so as to take the case out of the category of one between the original parties where there is not the least doubt that the carrier is not estopped to explain his receipt by showing it to be a false one or only partially a true one. The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325. But, passing that question, there can be no doubt that one should not be estopped by the conduct bf another, unless that other is acting for him in the premises. Big. Estop. 442; Id. 429; Whart. Ag. 127-139; 13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 657; Planters' Bank v. Merritt, 7 Heisk. 177; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall, at p. 676. It is sometimes said that the principal is estopped where the agent acts within the apparent scope of his authority, and this may be conceded here. But this railroad company did not authorize this agent to sign false or fictitious bills of lading. It said to the community: We are engaged in carrying merchandise to New York or elsewhere, over our lines, and we place this mail here to receive such as you have for transportation, and authorize him to give you a receipt for it and a written contract stipulating for its transportation. They did no more than this, and no more can be fairly inferred from what they did. It was not within the apparent scope of this authority to sign and issue documents for the mere purpose of having them attached to drafts or otherwise pledged as collateral security, irrespective of the actual possession of goods to be carried. It may well be doubted whether the directory itself, or the body of the stockholders even, could authorize the company to issue bills of lading without the merchandise in hand to be used for any purpose. The charter does not authorize such a business, and the company is not engaged in it. Therefore, it seems to me plain that the agent's authority, actual and apparent, was limited to issuing bills of lading on goods in hand, and all else was outside the agency, unless we are to treat these documents as against the carrier just as if they were as negotiable in this respect as bills and notes, which we have seen we are not authorized to do. Indeed, a bill of lading is not necessary at all, and the carrier's liability is fixed by delivery of the goods without it. Fox v. Hall, 36 Conn. 558; S. C. 4 Ben. 278; Shelton v. Merchants' Co. 4 J. & S. (N. Y.) 627; Hutch. Car, §§ 118,