Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/753

 MBBIWETHBE U. JUDGB OP MUHLBNBtJEG CODNTY COURT. 739 �The distinction between the "county coiirfc" proper and the "bourt of elaims" was not clearly recognized by the legislaturiB in the en8i(0t- ments made soon after the adoption of the constitution, and .subse-^ quant legislatures were still more indifferent to this distinction, and this increases the difficulty in arriving at the. legislative meanifig when it authorizes a "county court" to exercise powers or jurisdiction without designating who shall compose the court. �If the nature of the powers to be exercised is the test under the constitution whether the county court shall be held by the county judge or the county judge and the justices of the peace, we would not be much enlightened in this case; because, /when the constitui- tion says that the justices of the peaoe "may sit at the court of elaims and assist in levying the county levy and making appropria- tions only," that did not, strictly construed, embrace a levy made foc the payment of either the principal or interest of bonds issued for a subscription to a railroad company. The power to subscribe stock to a railroad, and leivy a tax to pay the bonds issued for the stock, might be conferred by the legislature on a county court comppsed of tUe county judge alone, or the county judge and the justices of "ihe county, or upon commissipnera selected for that purpose. �The court of appeals, in the Bowling Green e MadisorwUle Railroad Company Case, 10 Bush, 714, deoided "county court," as used in the charter of that company, meant the county judge and the justices of the peace. The ground of this decision was that the county cour| of Warren county was given a discretion of whether or not to submit the question of a subscription to the stock of the company to a vote of the people. The same court, in the case of Logan County v. Caldwell, MS. opinion of October, 1880, decided that the "county court," in the charter of Owensboro & Eussell ville Kailroad Company, meant the county judge alone, aeting as a court. �The ground of this decision was that the county court was not given an absolute discretion of whether or not the voice of the people of the county should be taken on the question of the county's sub- scription of stock to that road. �In the charter under consideration, the legislature has made no distinction in the language used when granting judicial powers, or those pertaining to the financial affairs of the county incident to .this subscription, nor has the legislature given the county court a discre- tion of whether or not to submit the question of the subscription to the vote of the people of the cpunty. Hence, this courte following the decision of the Kentucky court of appeals, .ftjid recQgnizing the ��� �