Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/719

 HATKB V. DAYTON. 705 �ing machines contain all the improvements embraced in the several patents, or it will be held bad for mnltifariousness, on demurrer. �In Gillespie v. Cummings, 3 Sawy. 259, in 187e, before Judge Saw- yer, the bill was founded on two patents for the manufacture of brooms, There was a demurrer on the ground of the joinder of two separate and distinct causes of action. It appearing by the bill that the defendant's broom, if infringing, must be an infringement of both of the patents, and that there was, therefore, a common point to be litigated, and much of the testimony must, from the nature of things, be applicable to both the patents, the bill was held good. �In Horman Patent Manufg Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co. 15 Blatchf. 444, in 1879, before Judge Benedict, a bill in equity on two patents alleged that the defendant was using machines containing, in one and the same apparatus, the inventions secured by each of the two patents. It was demurred to on the ground that it did not allege that the devices were used conjointly or connected together in any one apparatus, but the demurrer was overruled. The court held that as the bill did not show the controversy to be of such a oharac- ter that prejudice to the defendant would resuit from the joinder in one action of the causes of action joined, the bill must be sustained. The court was of opinion that, in the absence of any other fact, the circumstance that the two transactions complained of were the use, in a single machine, of two patented devices connected with the mechanism of the machine, warranted the inference that no preju- dice would resuit to the defendant from the joinder of the two transactions. �The decisions above cited all tend in one direction. The decision in Oase v. Redfield, 4 McL. 526, if limited, as it apparently ought to be, to the case of an original patent, and of another patent granted, in terms, as an improvement on the original patent, is not like the present case, as shown by the bill. It is a case difficult to under- stand, and, if it were like the present case in its facts, whatever there is in the decision of it tending to sustain the bill in this case, is opposed to all the other cases on the subject. �The present case appears to be a suit on 88 claims in 6 different patents. There is nothing to show that any two or more of the pat- ents are in fact, or are capable of being, used in making a single structure, much less that the defendant bas so used them. So .far as the bill shows, the causes of action are as distinct as the patents. v.8,no.9— 45 ��� �