Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/68

 54 FEDBBAIi SBFOSTEIt. �ing to the practioe of courts of equity. In his opinion the learned judge says : �" There is no statuts which confers on a court of admiralty of the United States those powers of sequestering property which appertain to a court of equity, nor is there any rnle which does so. The libellants have judgments, and, after executions have been issued and returned unsatisfled, they can resort to the proper court to reach any property which the debtors may have. But this court, sitting in admiralty, is not such court. The fact that the libellants could not recovei judgments on the stipulations or bonds in any other couit than the admiralty court, does not prevent their resorting to other courts, where they have obtained judgments in the admiralty court, to enforc© such judgments." �Prom this language the inference is drawn that by "resort to the proper court" was meant by the judge resort to the proper federal court, i. e'., the circuit court. But the language of the opinion does not, I think, warrant, that conclusion. Its meaning simply is that proceedings in such a case to reach the property of the debtors must be taken in the proper court; whether it be the state court or the federal court must necessarily depend upon jurisdictional right. �But it is further urged that jurisdiction of the piesent bill may be derivedfrom the first clause of the first section of the removal act of Maich 8, 1875, which provides that— �"The circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, con- current with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $600, and arising under the constitution or laws of the United States." �The argument is that the matter in dispute here arises under the constitution and laws of the United States; that the decree in admi- ralty, which is the foundation of this suit, is the creature of the fed- eral laws, and constitution, and that as this is a suit in equity for enforcement of such a decree, it is a suit within the meaning of the provision of the statute above quoted. I cannot concur in this view, and do not think it is supported by the adjudged cases bearing on the point. To uphold jurisdiction under the clause referred to in the act of 1875, I am of the opinion that it is not sufficient for the party merely to trace title or right through undisputed proceedings which may have been previously had by virtue of laws of the United States. The construction of the constitution or of a federal statute must be involved, or the right to present relief must be based upon the consti- tion or a statute, tcmake a case arising under the constitution or ��� �