Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/674

 660 FEDERAL REPORTER. �And in Riissell v. Wheeler, Hempst. 3, 6, it is said that, eVen — �"Where a limitee! jurisdiction is conferred by statute, the construction should be strict as to the extent of the jurisdiction, but liberal as to the mode of pro- ceeding; and, where a statute prescribes a fonn of proceeding, a substantial and not literal compliance is all that is required." �And so it was held in Heydon's Case, 3 Eep. 7 — �^'Tobe the duty of the Judges at all times to make such construction as should suppress the mischief or advanee the remedy; putting down all subtle inventions for continuance of the mischief, et pro privato commodo, and add- ing force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act, pro bono puhlico." Potter's JDwarris on Statutes, (Ed, A. D. 1875,), 184. �The supreme court of Pennsylvania says : �"It would not, perhaps,"" be easy to lay down any general rule as to when the provisions of a statute are merely directory, and when, mandatory or jm- perative. Where the words are atflrmati ve, and relate to the mannef in Which power or jurisdictioh vested in a public ofHcer or body is to be exercised; and not to the limits of the power or jurisdiction itself, they may and often have been eonstrued to be directory; but negative words, which go to the power or jurisdiction itself, have never, that I am aware of, been brought within. the category. A clause is directoiy when the provisions, contain mere matte^r of direction ai»d no more, but not so when they are followed by words of positive prohibition." Bladen v. PhiiadelpMa, 60 Pa. St. 464, 466; Norweglan -Sireei Case, 81 Ta. St. 349. ' �Where a statute directs a person to do a thing at a particular time, without any negative words restraining him' ff om doing it afterwards, or any expression from which such intent can be gathered, the'nam- ing of the time is directory, and not a limitation of authority. While, therefore, the duty may be performed at a subsequent time, and the action be valid, because time is not of the essence of the act, and is not a condition precedent to its validity, yet the statute should be obeyed, and the act done'at the time specified. niu}g y. Camden, 39 N. J. L. 620. Where the object contemplated by the legislature can- not be carried into effect by another construction, there the prescribed time must be eonsidered imperative; but when there is nothing indi- cating that the exact time is essential, it should be eonsidered as directory. Coit v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243, 254. Accidents may hap- pen which would defeat the authority if it cannot be exercised after the time mentioned. The naming the time must be, therefore, eon- sidered as directory and not a limitation of authority. Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 230; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180. Neither the nature of the act to be performed, nor the language used by the ��� �