Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/632

 618 FEDERAIj, REPORTEE. �penalty. The case of U. S. v. Harris, sitpra, refers to the power pf the president over the w^iole case, before judgnjent, as existing only where the prosecution is wholly in the name lOf the United States. �ihere is, therefore, nothing in the existence of the pardoning power which affects the present case. This being so, there can be no doubt that congress, which created the penalty, could provide any method of remitting it. �The next question is as to the construction of section 5294. It is contended, for the libellant, that; that section does not give to the sec- retary power to remit a penalty after a suit has been brought by a private person to recover it. The matter is a very plain one. The power extends to "any firve or penalty ;" that is, to all fines and penal- ties. It ihcludes those given to individuals as well as those given to the United States, frobably, beeause of a doubt whether the pardon- ing power of the president could r^ach all cases, and because cases proper for remission wpuld arise, the power of remission was confided to the secretary to be exercised on an ascertainment of facts, with the restrictions, bowever, that the power should not extend to remit- ting the penalty of imprisonment or of removal from office, or to afifecting the rights-of informers after they had been judicially deter- mined before the application for remission. �It is contended that the power to remit is restricted by the statute, after suit, to cases where the suit is by the United States and under the control of its offioers. It is also contended that the power given to remit applies only to cases before suit is brought, and that the power to discontinue prosecutions is limited to prosecutions brought by the, United States. These views do not seem well founded. The statute covers the remission of "any" fine or penalty, and although, under the words "discontinue any prosecution," the secretary should be held to be restricted to discontinuing prosecutions in the name of the United States, yet he may remit any penalty. �The limitation of the power of discontinuing prosecutions does not restrict the power of remission. A prosecution may be diseontinued without remitting the penalty, and there may be reasons for doing so; but no reason is perceived why the power to "discontinue any prosecution" does not includea suit like the present. Thereis noth- ing in section 5294 to suggest that the power of remission or of dis- continuance was not intended to be as broad as the imposition of penalties, except as to the particular matters specially excepted. �It is argued that the libellant is not an informer, within section 5294, because he is not a person on whose information the United ��� �