Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/631

 THE LAUEA. 617 �to remit penalties and forfeitures, of the character of those in the present case, as a valid power, in concurrence witb the power ot tble president to pardon in the same cases, The existence of the power in the secretary is not regarded as interfering with the pardoning power of the president. The decision in U. S. v. Morris, 10 Wheat. 246, that the secretary's remission of the entire forfeiture — the ves- sel having been seized as forfeited to the United States, aind prose- cuted in the name of the United States, and condemnea^ — ha'd the efiect to extinguish the interest of the officers ai the eustoins in the property, necessarily recognized the fact that the power of the secre- tary to remit was a valid power, and did not infringe on the pardon- ing power of the president. A power in the secretary to i-eiuit penalties and forfeitures bas existed by statute since 1790, and bas never been regarded as invalid because of the existence of the power in the president to remit, by pardon, the same penalties and forfeit- ures. Even assuming, then, that the president could dischiarge, by pardon, the interest of the libellant in the forfeiture of this Vessel, it does not seem that the secretary could not be lawfuliy authorized to discharge it. �But it may well be doubted whether the president's power of par- don extends to taking away the interest given by the statute to the libellant. If so, then there is no power of pardon to be interfered with by the remission of the secretary. The statute gives nothing to the United States. It does not authorize any prosecution by the United States by indietment or civil suit. It imposes a penalty, which is made a lien on the vessel, for doing what it declares it shall not be lawf ul to do ; but the penalty is declared to be a pecuniary liability, not to the United States, but to any one who will sue for it. It is wholly to such person. While the unlawful act which gives rise to the suit, if to be called an ofifence, is one denounced by a statute of the United States, yet it may well be doubted whether it is an offence against the United States, in the sense of the constitution ; and, still more, whether, if the United States could sue for the penalty which is given to "any person suing for the same," there is any offence against the United States which can be pardoned by the president beyond what is involved in such right of the United States to sue. The power, however, of the president to pardon has never been construed to extend to taking away such rights as the stat- ute in this case vests in the libellant, where they have been asserted by a suit brought by an informer in bis own name, and whefe they belong wholly to him, and the United States have no share in the ��� �