Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/558

 O14 FEDSBAL BEFOBTeB. �Eoss V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Et. Co. �{'Jircuit Court, D. Minnesota. June 24, 1881.) �1. RirLHOADS — CoNDtrcTOES — Engineers— Fellow Servants. �Conductors and engineers are not fellow servants, so far as regards the per- formance of the duty therein specifled, under thefollowingorder: " Conductors must, in all cases, while running by telegraph or special orders, show the same to the engineer of their train before leaving stations where the orders are re- ceived. The engineer must read and undersiand the order before leaving the station." �2. Same — Negugbnce of Co-Emplote — Notice. �A railroad company is liable to an employe who is injured by the negligence of a co-employe of whose negligent character it hadbeen notifled, provided the accident which occasioned the injury occurred before the expiration of a reason- able time for the company to take proper action ih the premises after such notice had been given. �3. Reabonable Time. �Four weeks would not be an unreasonable time under the circumstanccs of this case. �McCraey, g. J., (charging jury.) It is your exclusive province to consider and decide all the disputed questions of fact which arise in this case. It is the duty of the court, however, to instruct you con- ceming the questions of law which arise, and which ought to be un- derstood by the jury in order that they may properly apply the facts to the case. �The plaintiff sues the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries which he has received, as he alleges, through the negligence of the defendant. The controlling question in the case, then, is one of negligence. The fundamental inquiry is whether the plaintiff has received his injury because of the negligence of the defendant, and without any negligence of his own. Negligence is the want of ordi- nary care and prudence — such ordinary eare and prudence as a man of common intelligence would exercise under the circumstances. �The defendant here is a corporation, and, in the nature of things, a corporation must always act by and through its agents and serv- ants. A corporation is an artificial thing — in law, it is a person; but it is not tangible, and has no visible existence that we ean see and handle. It acts by its officers and agents. The question here is whether this corporation has been guilty of negligence by which the plaiutiff has been injured. The general raie is that a corporation is bound by the acts of its agents and servants, and is liable for their negligence in the performance of the duties which it imposes upon them. That is the general rule, but to that general rule there is an ��� �