Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/486

 e72 FEDERAL REPORTER. �diminution in the value upon which duties were to be paid, and not a change in the duties to be paid upon that value. The resuit was the payment of a smaller amount ot duties, not because of a "change of duties," but because the value of the goods upon which the duties were paid was smaller. This resulted from no action ot congress, or of anybody else acting Under the authority of congtess, intended to affect either the amount or rate of duties, but Was incidental to the exercise of other powers to regulate' the money of the dountry, and purely accidentai. If might as well be claiuied that a diminished oi' increased amount of duties, resdltiifg ifrom a diminution or appre- ciation of the durable value of the goods aftei* the contract and before importatidh, resulting from any other' 'eau¥e, is'within the terms of the clause of tha contrdct idi' question. '!Ead tte parties contemplated a change in thd amount td be paid' resultiug frdm a change in the value of the rupee, it is more reasonable to suppiase that they would have made the clause read something like this, "Atiy ehainge in duties, or in the value of the curfeney of Xndia, (or the rupee,) to be for or against the purchaser," than to suppose the con- struction now claimed for the clause in' question tp have been con- templated. The change in value of the rupee is quite as distinct and independent a contingency to bo conaidered and provided for as the "change in duties," and the langiiage suggested would be far more apt and appropriate to express the additional idea, The more natural construction of the language used is to limit it to a direct change in the rate of duties by congressional legislation, or by author- ity of congressional legislation, and not to extend it to changes in amount of duties rarely affected, and in,cidentally and accidentally resulting from legislation and oflScial action intended to effect other objects having no reference to duties or revenues. �This is the conclusion to which my mind has come from a consid- eration of the language itself, viewed in the light of the general and legislative history of the country, without considering the testimony of witnesses relating to the general understanding of merehants as to the purpose and signification of the clause in question. �If, however, testimony is competent to show what the purpose and signification of the claiise is as generally understood in the mercan- tile community where the contract is made, then the testimony clearly shows that it is understood to be limited to changes in the rate of duty by authority of congressional legislation, as I have already held. The plaintiffs' counsel insist that if this testimony is admissible, it can have no significance for the reason that the provision now found ��� �