Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/422

 408 FEDERAL REPORTER. �civil action of that code which has taken the place of all common law actions and the suit by bill in chancery. At the same time, the distinction in the substance of common law and equitable rights is still maintained. In Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St. 413, it is said : �"The distinction between legal and equitable rights existsln the subjects to which they relate, and is not affected by the form or mode of procedure that may be prescribed for tUeir enforceoient. ihe C^de abolished the dis- tinction between actions at lavy and siiits in equity, and substituted in their place oue form of action ; yet the rights and liabilities of parties, as distin- guished l/om the mode of procedure, remain the same since, as before, the adoption of the Code," �To the same effeot is Chinn v. Trustees, etc., Sa Ohio St. 836. In Hager v. Reed, 11 Ohio St. 636, the court held that the action of the Code will be regarded and tre^/ted as a civil action at law or a civil action in chancery, according as the f acts alleged and the relief proper shall determine. �While, therefore, there may be no reason why the remedies, although new, given by this statute may not be enforced in the courts of the United States, there still remains, in each case, the question whether it shall be by action at law or suit in equity; for in these courts the formai distinction in procedure is maintained. Indeed, there are fundamental constitutional reasons which require that common-law rights of action shall not be transferred to the jurisdiction of chancery process. While it may be true, therefpre, that section 5779 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio would authorize the complainant, under the circumstances shown in this case, to com- mence an action for the purpose of determining the adverse estate or interest in the land in controversy claimed by the defendant, the question whether that action shall be by bill in chancery on the equity side of the court, must depend on the other question, whether he has or has not a complete and adequate remedy at law. If the rights in controversy are legal rights as distinguished from equitable, and if there are no considerations of an equitable nature applicable to the case, and which it is necessary to apply in order to prevent a failure of justice, then the conclusion seems to be required that the remedy must be sought by an action at law, and not by a suit in equity. �In the present case there seems to be no necessity for a resort to equity, and no special considerations to justify it. The defendant had already brought his action at law to try the very matters the complainant seeks to put in issue in this suit ; so that there was no ��� �