Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/38

 2e FEDERAL REPORTEXt. �was effected by the defendants to the bill in chaneery, against whom the relief was asked. �But by section 646, Eev. St., it is now provided that — "Any injunction granted before the removal of the cause against the de- fendant applyingfor its removal shall continue in force until modifled or dis- solved by the United States court luto which the cause is removed." �And by section 646, Eev. St., (act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 4, 18 St. 571,) it is provided, in reference to all cases removed from a state court, that — �"AU injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in sueh suit prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolvedor modifled by the court tp which such suit shall be removed." �It is clear, then, that by virtue of this last-mentioned provision the injunction in the present case is continued in force until other- wise ordered by this court, and does not cease to operate by the per- emptory effect of the prohibition contained in section 720. And the inference from sections 640 and 646 is equally cogent to my mind, that in the cases provided for it is the intention of the law to authorize and require that the question of dissolving, continuing, or perpetuat- ing the injunction originally granted by the state court, shall be dealt with by the courts of the United States, into which the cause shall have been lawfully removed, without in anywise being affected by section 720, and that it shall be disposed of by the courts upon its merits, precisely as it ought to have been disposed of by the state tribunals if the cause had not been removed. This construction of these several provisions of the law is necessary, that they may each have Bome effect, and restrains the interpretation of section 720 to cases where the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is originally invoked for the very purpose of staying proceedings in state courts. �(2) The question, then, seems, whether this injunction ought origi- nally to have been granted, and whether it ought now, upon general principles of equity jurisprudence, to be permitted to stand. Upon this point it is urged by counsel, in support of the motion to dissolve, that it is not a case for equitable interference, for the reason that the party has a complete and adequate remedy at law. �It seems, in the present condition of the case, hardly necessary to enter upon the discussion of that question. The whole scope of the injunction, as originally prayed for and allowed, was simply to re- Btrain the sale of the stock of goods held by the sheriff of Fairfield county, under the execution of Bharpe aud the complainants' order ��� �