Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/213

 OABT V. CITY OF OTTAWA. 199 �Hampstiire, whether the notice of 30 days has been given or not? I answer this question in the negative. I consider the second tenn to be the regular trial term for such cases. This cause was not ready because the special notice was not given. If that notice was merely an ordinary notice, or setting down for trial of a cause which is ready, the answer would be different. The distinction is that this notice is an extraordinary one, intended to give the opposite party an oppor- tunity, before the case is in court, to prepare for its trial, thus antici- pating ont of court a part of the time which is usually allowed for pleadings and preparation after the action is entered. If a, cause is not in a situation to be tried at a given term excepting by consent of both parties, that is not the term at which it can be tried, unless that consent has been given. Palmer v. Hall, 4 Dill. 566, 669. �Preston v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 58 N. H. 76, upon the authority of which the ruling in the state court is said to have been made, decides, in accordance with several other cases which I have cited, that a case which is ready for trial at any time must be removed then and not after- wards, though the docket happens to be so f ull that it is not reached. The difference is that this case is not ready for trial, and neither party could have required the other to try it, however elear the doeket may have been. It was not from an accidentai or unusual delay or hin- drance, but in regular course, that this cause was continued at the first term without trial. �Motion to remand denied. ���Cary v. City op Ottawa. {Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois. July 15, 1881.) �Municipal Bonds — Ultua Vibbs. �The city of Ottawa was etnpowered by its charter to issue bonds to an unlim- ited extent for corporate purposes, if such issue was sanctipned by a vote of the people. An ordinance was passed by the city council authorizing the mayor of the city to borrow money " to be expended in developing the natural advantages of the city for manufacturing purposes," and providing "that bonds of the city be issued therefor." This ordinance was submitted to the people at an election called for that purpose, and a majority of the votes were cast in its favor. The bonds were issued, and upon their becoming due the city refused to pay them. This action was brought by a holder of past-due bonds, to which the defence set up is, in substance, a deniai of the power of the city to issue them, and an allegation that the plaintiff holds the same charged with notice of such want of power. Hdd ; (1) The city, in issuing these bonds for the pur- pose above specified, was acting within its powers; (2) this being so, it la immaterial whether or not the plaintiff, a bonafide purchaser for value, knew for what purpose the bonds were to be issued. ��� �