Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 8.djvu/180

 ,.lsg6 FEDERAL REPORT&B. �beatIQg — within the- admiralty jtirisdiction must be in personam. The case of a death resulting from sucb injury or the negligence of another is not pro-vided for in the rules. In The Seq Gull, Cbase's Dec. 146, whioh was a sijit in rem hy a husband for the deatb of his wife, a stewardess on the Xeary, caused by; a collision with the Sea Gull, it was held that the remedy-niigbt be in rem as well as in personam, upon the ground tbat, in principle, there is no distinction in this respect between wrong to persone and things. But in Tke Ilighland Light, Id. 151, which was a suit in rem by the widow for the death of her busband, employed at the time as a "band" on the Light, caused by the collapsing of her steam cbimney, it "sras beld that under sec- tion 30 of the steam-boat act of 1852, (10 St. 72,) since section 43 of the act of 1871, (16 St. 445,) now section 4493, Eev. St., tiiat the rem- edy in rem for an injnry caused by a negleot to comply with the law governing the navigation of steam-vessels was confined to passen- gers, and therefore persons employed thereon and injured in conse- quence of sucb neglect were limited to the remedy in personam. �This case apparently cornes within that ruling, as the deceased was employed on the Cbief and lost his life, as is alleged, by the neglect of the master to obey the rules governing the navigation of said ves- sel in passing the Oregon. A collision and his death was the conse- quence of this neglect. �As to the second and third exceptions they are disallowed. It does not appear from the libel, as assumed by the latter, that the deceased was aware of the alleged incompetence of the master ; and, if it did, it does not necessarily follow that sucb knowledge is a defence to the action. �And while it does appear that the deceased was in the service of the same person as the master, and engaged in the same general employment, it does not follow from this that be was a "fellow serv- ant" of the master in that sense which would exonerate the common employer from liability for an injury to one of them caused by the negligence or misconduot of the other. �The deceased was merely the fireman on the Chief, and as sucb subject to the orders of the master. He was an inferior servant, injured by the misconduot of a superior one, for which injury there is mueb authority and more reason for holding the common employer liable. Packet Co. v. McCue, 17 Wall. 513 ; Railway Co. v. Fort, Id. 557; Bera Stone Co. v. Craft, 31 Ohio St. 289; G. & N. W. Ry. Co. V. Morando, 34 Am. Eep. 168 ; S, C. 93 111. 302 ; Devany v. Vulcan Iron Works, 4 Mo. Ap. Eep. 236; Brabbits v. C. e N. W. Ry. Co. 38 ��� �