Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/716

 704 FEDBBAL BEPOBTaR. �language as renders it immaterial whether death was the imuiediate resuit of the injury, or whether time intervened. The case in 9 Cushing is not an authority here. The statute of Massachusetts, as construed by the court of that state, was passed to keep alive a cause of action which the partydying had at the time of his death ; that of Nevada to give a new right of action, in which one measiire of damages should be the pecuniary loss to the kindred. �Upon the language of the Code of Tennessee, which is not Boclear as that of the statute of this state, it has been held that the fact that death was instantaneous was not material. Bailroad Co. v,, Price, 2 Hei8i^580. This case was made stronger by the holding afterwards that the action under the Gode "was for the same cause as it would have been had the action been brought by the injured party in his life- time." Fawlks Y. Railroad, 5 Bax. 663. In this latter case it was again held that the Code made no distinction between cases of instantaneous death and others. The case of Brown v. Railroad Co. 22 N. Y. 191, is a decision upon a statute identieal with the Nevada statute, so far as the first section, which confers the right of action, goes, and is pre- cisely in point for the plaintiff. It was there held that it makes no difference, under the New York statute, whether the death is the immediate or instantaneous resuit, or whether it is consequential. So in Connecticut, under a statute pro- viding that "actions for injury to the person, whether the same do or do not resuit in death, * * * shall survive to the executor or administrator." Gen. St. of Conn., Ee- vision of 1866, § 98. It has been held that the words "whether the injury do or do not resuit in death," have put an end to the common-law maxim in this class of cases that personal actions die with the persoq, and that it was immaterial whether death was instantaneous or consequential. The case in 9 Cushing is said to be somewhat "nice and technical," even as a construction of the statute of Massachusetts; but because the language of the statutes of the two states was not the same, it was not regarded by the supreme court of Connecticut as an authority which it was necessary to over- ��� �