Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/630

 61S FBDBBAL BEFOBTEB. �able in equity by the children, but that the acquisition of a further interest, by the payment of subsequent' premiums, ■vyas executpry, apd was not acquired by her, and could not, therefore, be claimed by her beneficiaries. Thip ruling goes olearly on the ground that, up to the time of the assignment of the polioy, and for all which the policy then represented, the children had a vested interest acquired by executed gift. �Mr. Bliss, in bis work on Life Insurance, § 317, states it as the general rule "that a policy, and the money to become due under it, belong, the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it as the ]>eneaoisiXj or beneficiaries, and that there is no power in the person procuring the in- surance, by any act of his or hers, by deed or "will, to trans- fer to any other person the interest of the person named. " These, including the Wisconsin cases, are some of the lead- ing authorities on this question. Others are cited in the opinion of Cassoday, J., in Poster v. Gile, supra. They are referred to rather for the purpose of showing the state of decision on the subject, than otherwise, for the facts set out in the present bill are somewhat peculiar, and seem to make this case distinguishable, except as some general principles are involved, from any of the deoided cases to which I am referred. �Whatever principle of law might be regarded as applicable and controlling if the right of Mrs. Kemna to the first policy in which she was named as beneficiary, or its proceeds, was involved, an important fact in the case is that the complain- ant surrendered that policy and received from the company a paid-up policy, payable to Mrs. Kemna in 1875. The same was done with reference to the other policies in which his other daughters are named as beneficiaries. This new policy, payable to Mrs. Kemna, was an absolute promise on the part of the company, in consideration of the past pay- ments of premiums, to pay her |1,690. It was not a pol- icy liable to lapse, but it constituted an absolute, fixed liability, and the question is whether, as between the father and the ■daughter, it was not an executed gift from him which he ��� �