Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/594

 682 FEDERAL REPORTBE. �facts and arguments do not inform me ttiat there bas been a^y decision, or any practice, since that aot was passed, until tliis controversy arose, goveming the classification of web- biug which la composed partly of wool and partly of India rubber. �Again, it may be said that all the articles mentioned in this clause are articles of dress, or of trimming and orna- ment ; and that, by the rule of noscitur a sociis, the webbings (it is webbing in the singular in the India-rubber clause) may be held to be certain particlar kinds of -vfebbing, used for similar purposes. �A third argument is that elastic webbing bas been classi- fied with suspenders, etc., under the India rubber-clause, for nearly 40 years, and that it eannot be supposed that con- gress, in enacting the wool tariff of 1867, intended to change it. If, then, the clauses would, upon their face, appear re- pugnant, the wool clause should be construed to refer to web- bing which contains wool, and does not contain India rubber, especially as the latter is a very specifie and limited class, and as the goods in question derive their usefulness entirely from their elastio quality. The words in the elastic- webbing clause, "not otherwise provided for," seem to refer to other fabrics of India rubber, such as shoes and boots, which are mentioned two lines lower down, and pay a smaller duty. I gave too much weight to that qualification in Faxon v. Rus- sell, and was corrected by the supreme court. Though the wool clause was historically later in its origin than the India- rubber clause, they stand together in the Revised Statutes, and form part of one contemporaneous enactment. �Steadiness in the rules and methods of taxation is very important. On the part of the United States the argument is very strongly urged that the wool tariff was intended to provide for every article known to commerce which is made in whole or in part of that material, and to repeal all other laws which assessed a duty on anything of that sort. I find it very difficult to reconcile these provisions of law, or to say wnich must be preferred. Upon the whole, in consideration ��� �