Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/547

 IRVriN V. IIEYBOSE. ^85 �record. And, therefore, in truth, the rule in cach country is precisely the Bame, in legal eiiect, although expressed in different langnage, namely, that the bill of review must be founded on soine error apparent upon the bill, answer, and other pleadings and decree ; and that you are not at lib- erty to go into the evidence at large in order to establish an objection to the decree founded on the supposed mistake of the court in ita own deductions from the evidence." �In the case of Kennedy v. Georgia State Bank, 8 How. 586, the United States supreme court again referred to the doc- trine governing bills of review in this language : �" This bill has been considered by some of the defendants' counsel as a bill of review. But it hag neither the form nor the substance of such a bill. Bince the ordinances of Lord Bacon, a bill of review can only be brought for ' error in law appearing in the body of the decree or record,' without further examinatioa of matters of fact, or some new matter of fact discovered, which was not known, and could not possibly have been used, at the time of the decree." �The same question underwent review in Putnam v. Day, �22 Wall. 60: �" We think the rule to be well established, and a wholesome one, that expressly held in Whiting v. Bank of U. S. It is true that in our prac- tice the final decree does not contain a summary of the facts, as it did in theEnglish practice, which summary was examinableon a billof review; but, to countervail this absence of statement in the decree, we have adopted the practice of looking back of the decree into the whole record of the pleadings and proceedings, including ordera, master's report, etc., together constituting what is generally regarded as the recoird in the cause, and necessary to be examined in order to a proper understanding of the decree itself. This makes a record aimilar to that of a common-law action, the decree being the judgment of the law upon the allegations of the parties, and the conclusion which the court deduces from the proofs. But the conclusions of fact deduced from the proofs are not spread upon the record in extenso unless through the medium of a report made by a master or commissioner. The eighty-sixth rule in equity, adopted by this court, has abolished the recital of the pleadings and proceedings in the decree, and haa prescribed the form in which it shall be couched, as follows : �" ' This cause came on to be heard at this term, and was argued by coun- sel ; and thereupon, in consideration thereof, it was ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows, viz.:' [Here inserting ths decree of order. J The decree, it is true, may proceed xo atate conclusiona of fact as well as of law, and often does so, for the purpose of rendering the judgment of the court more clear and specifie. The record thus made up constitutes the basia of examination on a bill of review, but it never contains the proofs adduced in the cause. " �In the case of Bufington v. Harvey, 95 U. S. 99, the same ��� �
 * * the proofs cannot be looked into on a bill of review. This was so