Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/493

 BRIOKILL V. THE MATOB, ETO., Ot NEW YOEK. 481 �construeteS Substantially as described, and' the construction described is of what was neW with Brickill, flo that this vieW cannot prevail. He made tHe invention while in the employ of the fire department of the city of New York, and attaebed the apparatus to two fire-engines, which were those numbered 12 and 26, biniself, and it appears to have gone into exten- sive use in that fire department, and to have been of greai utility in obtaining speedy control of fires. To make it required more than mere mechanical skill or workmanship applied to wbat was in existence or known befbre. The prin- ciples of it were to be wrought out, and devices to be con- etructed and applied to meet the neeessary requirements^ The aceomplishment of the resuit imrolved the exercise of inventive faculties to a considerable degree, wbicb, concur- fing with the utility, eleafly makes the invention patentable. �The patent was granted under the acts of 1836 and 1839; and the constructions attached to engiues Nos. 12 and 26 were made and attaebed bef ore the application for a patent. It is strenuously argued that under section 7 of the latter act, which provides that every person and corporation may use, and vend to others to be used, any specifie machine, man- ufacture, or composition of matter which they have purchased or constructed prior to the application for a patent, as con- strued in McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the defendant bas not only the right to use those constructions, but also the'full right to practice the invention without liability. 5 St. at Large, 353. The patent in that case was for a method of casting iron rollers so as to throw the dross into the center instead of leaving it on the surface, and the real question before the court was whether that statute, using the words "specifie machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" only, should be applied to a patent for that process. In some parts of the reasoning, language broad enough to cover all patents was used in coming to the conclusion that the stat- ute should not be limited, in its application, to those patents only which were for some specifie thing, and that it should apply to the invention itself where there was no such thing. It bas been said that, iii order to understand this language, �v.T.no.4— 31 ��� �