Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/375

 THE ALPKNA. 363 �His opinion upon this point, however, is not supported by any adjudicated case, or by any other elementary writer, and it seems to run counter to the established practice of courts of admiralty from the earliest days. In construing doubtful words, in rules of practice, I think that great weight should be giveu to a practice which has immemorially existed, irre- spective of written rules. �In Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473, 493, Mr. Justice Johnson, delivering the opinion of the supreme court, says : �"To all the questions which may be supposed to arise on this part of the case we give one general answer, viz. : That as goods and credits in the liands of a third person, wherever situated, may be attached by notice, there cannot be a reason assigned why the goods themselves, if accessible, should not b« actually attached ; and although it is very clear that the process of attaching by notice seems giveu as the alternative, where the officer cannot have access to the gooda themselves, yet all this may be confided to the discretion of the judge whoorders the process." �The question was wbether the marshal could make actual seizure of defendant's property; but it was assumed, upon the authority of Clarke's Praxis, that the goods and credits of the defendant in the bands of third persons might be attached by the service of a notice. �In Reed v. Hussey, B. & H. 525, it is assumed rather than decided that any personal property in the hauds of a third party may be reached by gamishment, but cannot be actu- ally seized unless in the actual or constructive possession of the owner. �In Bouysson v. Miller, Bee's Kep. 186, the leamed jndge for the district of South Carolina, the father of admiralty law in this country, held, upon the authority of Clarke's Praxis, that an attachment might issue against the goods of a defendant in the hands of a third person. Such, also, is the clear assumption in the cases of Smith v. Miln, Abbott's Adm. 373; and Shoreyw.Rennell, 1 Sprague, 41S; Ben. Adm. § 428-435. ' �There is no doubt that, by the second general admiralty rule, an attachment is authorized against the goods and chat^ tels of a defendant if found within the district and in the possession of the defendant or his agent ; and instead of re- ��� �