Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/342

 030 FEDERAL KBPORTEK. �sheriff's deed is as much the assignee of snch a covenant as though the conveyance were made by the covenanfcee himself. Carten v. Ex'r of Denman, 3 Zab. 271. �it seems to me there is a olear analogy between the case at bar and these just cited. In Page v. Rogers, supra, at page 306, in ilhistrating the similarity between a voluntary vendor for cash with a covenant to convey in six months and a defeasance back, and an involuntary sale of a debtor's interest in land with a right to redeem, the court said : �" In the case of the voluntary vendor, as well as of the judgment debtor, other parties, by purchasing his interest under executions or upon volun- tary sales, could acquire his interest and defeat the estate of the vendes by performing the conditions, as well as in the case of redemptioners under execution sales." �Thus, whenever it is determined that a debtor has an interest in land which is subject to seizure and sale under execution, then the marshal's certificate of sale transfers the whole of that interest to the purchaser, of whatsoever nature, legal or equitable, it may be. If equitable, the purchaser acquires a right to do those things which are necessary to preserve the estate. In this case, Me Williams purchased a valuable estate in the land, and he got all he purchased at the sale. If he failed to complete the payment and perfect the title it was his own fault. The law (section 3820, Comp. Laws) is framed with a view to transfers of interest during the continuance of the contract. It is provided that "when full payment shall have been made patents shall issue to the IJurcKaser, his or her heirs or assigna." I think, then, that Mc- Williams, after the purchase by him of Withington's interest, was subrogated to him in respect to this time contract, and had an undoubted right to make payments thereon. �It is still insisted that the remedy in a case like this ought to be sought by action and not by motion. It is of little importance now, for the motion must be denied. I examined the matter very carefully when the demurrer was decided, and, if the case made here were as stated in the petition^ ishould see no reason to doubt the correctness of my former ■conclusion. This is a proceeding of an equitable character. ��� �