Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 7.djvu/130

 lis FEDERAL REPORTER. �keeper, mechanic, workman, or bailee who shall have a lien upon any chattel property." These classes of persons have, as is well understood, this common-law possessory lien, and mechanics and workmen certainly have ordinarily, and in the absence of a special contract, and independently of this stat- ute, only this mode of securing themselves. They have not by law a lien with any right or power to sell. The statute is remediai, and should have a liberal construction to efifect its apparent purpose. This particular class of lienors certainly stood in more obvions need of legislative aid than any other, to enlarge and make more effectuai their right, which, as it existed at common law, bas been often found a barren and ineJBFectual method of securing their just dues. Therefore, this class of lienors being fairly withiu the language of the act, and their relief by such legislation being more obviously oalled for by considerations of public policy than that of any class of lienors who already had a right to enforce their se- cnrity by a sale, I think the statute was intended to include them. Sucb has been the view taken also by the state court. �The claimant's objections to the libellant *s recovery not being well taken, there must be a decree for the libellant. �7. The libellant insists that the judgment in the proeeed- ing in the state court, though void as a proceeding for fore- closure, is yet a conclusive determination of the fact of the existence of the lien and the amount of the debt due to him; that to this extent the remedy given by the statute is a com- mon-law remedy, which the state court had jurisdiction to administer; and therefore, to this extent, the judgment is valid and binding on the parties. If the statute provided for a separate money judgment for the amount of the debt, in addition to the judgment for foreclosure, this argument would seem to be well founded. But it does not do so, nor was Buch judgment in fact recovered in the case. It appears to me that the ascertainment of the amount due is incidental, merely, to the chief purpose of the action, which is the fore- closure of the lien; and the court not having jurisdiction to make a decree of foreclosure, the judgment is not binding as to siich incidental finding of the amount due. It is true ��� �