Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 6.djvu/790

 778 FEDERAL REPORTER. �The counsel for defendant cites no authority in support of his position that the practice of entertaining "fisliing" bills to reach assets not specifically described in the bill, and of appointing a receiver over ail the property of the defendant, is entirely the creation of the New York Eevised Statutes, and of the rules framed under it by Chancellor Walworth. The provisions referred to were introduced into the Eevised Statutes of New York chiefly to set at rest the questio vexata which had been raised by the cases of Hadden v. Spader and Donavan v. Fin, already noticed. See Eevisers' Notes, 3 Eev. St. 669, (2d Ed.) Authority was given to compel, in aid of an unsatisfied judgment crediter, a discovery of any prop- erty, money, or things in action due to the debtor or held in trust for him, and to prevent the transfer of any such prop- erty, etc., and to decree satisfaction out of such property, "whether the same was originally liable to be taken in execution or not." The doctrine of Hadden v. Spader was thus explic- itly recognized or adopted by legislation; but the powers of the court of chancery were not otherwise enlarged. It was merely authorized to do with regard to assets not originally liable to execution what it had always been conceded it had a right to do with regard to stocks, debts, etc., purchased by naeans of j^io^^erty fraudulently withdrawn from execution. �The fact, therefore, that Chancellor Walworth adopted, and, until the court of chancery was abolished, maintained, the rules in question, is the strongest argument to show that the practice thus established was agreeable to the general principles and methods of equity procedure. Certainly the authority to entertain "fishing" bills to reach undescribed assets, and to appoint a receiver of ail the property of the defendant, is not in terms conferred by the statute. �The appointment of a receiver of ail the property of the defendant is in truth, as we have seen, in the nature, not of an attachment, but of a sequestration, which, by the ancient practice of the court of chancery in England, issued, as of course, upon the failure of the defendent to comply with the decree, (Daniell, 1047-10485) and the process of sequestra- tion is stili in use in England, Id. 1042. We have also seen ��� �