Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 6.djvu/358

 346 FEDERAL REPORTER. �This shop was erected upon the land by license of the plain- tiflf, with the right to purchase the same. That privilege has not yet been exercised. �In addition to the questions of fact in the case, the defend- ants contend: �First. That the plaintiff, holding nierely undef a quit- claim deed, cannot be a hona fide purchaser without notice. �It is true that in a class of cases in equity no person deriving title merely by a quitclaim deed is considered a iona fide purchaser, (Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333; May v. Le Olair, 11 Wall. 217; Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578;) but I do not think that this principle or these decisions are appli- cable to this statute. The questions under this statute of good' faith and of belief are those of fact. Were the im- provements made in good faith and in the belief of an absolute title ? If they were in fact so made, the plaintiff is entitled to the remedy. By the words "good faith" I do not think that the legislature had in view an arbitrary rule that a par- ticular kind of conveyance necessarily bars the existence of good faith in the purchaser. The statute was intended to be remediai, and to provide that if good faith and belief actually existed, the deeds not showing upon their face that an abso- lute title was not conveyed, and the purchaser not being chargaable with laches, then the equitable powers of the courts might be exercised. �Second. It is claimed that, inasmuch as the plaintiff rebuilt his burned mill after notice of the claim of Mrs. Bragg, he cannot be considered as having acted in good faith so far as subsequent improvements are concerned. �Prior to the Eevision of 1875 the belief of good title was alone required. The statute now provides that the ejectment defendant shall also have made improvements in good faith. Mere belief of title is not sufficient. A wealthy occupant is not to make, without good reason, extensive improvements upon land which is to his knowledge eamestly claimed by another. The reputed owner must act in good faith ; that is to say, fairly, considerately, in good conscience, with integ- rity of purpose, and without rash haste. But it may not be ��� �