Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/92

 80 FEDERAL REPORTER. �the decisions in the federal courts favored it, and that it was expedient that the case should be tried on its merits before it was taken up on appeal. �In the Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 532, Mr. Justice Clifford incidentally considers the question and says : "DiflS- culties, it must be conceded, will attend the solution of the question, but it is not necessary to decide it in this case." �In The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 146, Chief Justice Chase sus- tained a libel by a husband for damages for the death of his wife, caused by a collision between the Sea Gull and the Leary on the Chesapeake. In the course of his opinion he cites, with approval, the observation of Mr. Justice Sprague in Cutting v. Seahury, 1 Sprague, 523, that "the weight of authority in common-law courts seems to be against the ac- tion," — for damages on account of the death of a person, — "but natural equity and the general principles of law are in favor of it;" and adds: "Certainly, it better becomes the humane and liberal proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, -when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules." And in The Highland Light, Chase's Dec. 151, which was a libel in rem by the widow and son of an employe on the vessel who lost his life by the col- lapse of a steam-chimney, the chief justice affirmed his rul- ing in The Sea Gull, and said: "The jurisdiction for marine torts in admiralty may be said to be co-extensive with the subject. It depends on the locality of the wrong, not upon its estent, character, or the relations of the person injured." �But it is unnecessary to consider this point further, as the libellant claims to recover under the statute of this state, (section 367, Or. Civ. Code,) which provides : "When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action at law therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter, for an injury done by the same act or. omission. Such action shall be commenced within two years after the death, and the damages therein shall not ����