Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/899

 SPANGLEB V. SELLERS. '887 �«f doubt ; but in the view I have takën of this case ît is not necessary to determine this question, for the negligence charged consisted in the manner of the taking of the case to the supreme court; and that the defendant in fact did take the case to the supreme court, and in doing so would be ■under the same obligations to the plaintiff as to the manner ■of performing such services as if he had been by bis contract bound to their performance. �What, then, were the obligations wbich the law imposed upon the defendant in conducting the business he had thus undertaken ? �It did not require of him the possession of perfect legal knowledge, and the highest degree of skill in relation to busi- ness of that character, nor that he would conduct it with the greatest degree of diligence, care, and prudence. But it xequired that he should possess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members oftbe profession ; and that, in the discharge of the duties he had assumed, he would be ordi- narily and reasonably diligent, caref ul, and prudent. Whar- ton's Law of Negligence, 749, 750; Shearman & Eedfield's Law of Negligence, 211 ; Wells' Atty. and Client, 285. �If this be the true rule, it follows, as a sequence, that if the defendant bas failed to bring to the discharge of the duties assumed by him the ordinary legal knowledge and skill possessed by members of the profession, or bas failed to ■discharge the duties with ordinary and reasonable diligence, «are, and prudence, he would be guilty of negligence, and be liable to the plaintiff for the amount of damages he had sus- tained by reason thereof. �The, negligence charged relates to the management by the ■defendant of the case in the district court, and consists in bis taking the case to the supreme court without having first made and filed in said court a motion for a new trial. The petition shows that a bill of exceptions was taken, embody- ing the record and ail the evidence, but that no motion was made for a new trial, and that the supreme court dismissed ihe proceedings in error, and af&rmed the judgment below lor that reason. ����