Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/886

 874 FEDERAL REPORTER. �announced, the court held in that case that where a statute authorized a municipal corporation to issue bonds, and exer- cise the power of local taxation in order to pay them, and persons have bought and paid for such bonds in good faith, the power of taxation thus conferred is a contract within the meaning of the constitution, and cannot be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied. This principle was somewhat en- larged, and then applied in Memphis v. United States, 97 U. 8. 293. �In Webster v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 93, the supreme court of Ten- nessee held that the remedy existing at the time a contract is entered into is a vested right, which cannot be taken away unless some other efficient remedy is provided. "The legis- lature," say the court, "have complete control over the form of the remedy, the mode of proceeding by which the legal obligation is enforced, and in ail that pertains to this may alter, change, or modify its laws as discretion may dictate;" but that "in no case can it, by direct enactment for that pur- pose, nor even by indirection, where such is the purpose, ren- der the remedy easentially less effective for the enforcement of the obligation to which the party had bound himself by his agreement." �The remedy then provided by law, and existing for the enforcement of contracts at the time they are exeouted, and in the place where they are to be performed, or some other remedy equally as efficacious or nearly so, is an essential ele- ment of the obligation which the constitution protects against impairment ; and any statute enacted to essentially impair, weaken, or render the remedy less effective is in conflict with the constitution, and therefore yoid. �Have these principles any application to this case ? Mem- phis was, before its extinction, a municipal corporation, char- tered at the instance and for the convenient and better government of its inhabitants. It was invested with the authority |o contract. debts. It owned no property, and was neither authorized nor expected to acquire any, except such as it might.purchase for public uses, and which, on account of its charaoter, as well as by statute, would be (exempt from exe- ����