Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/773

 LEE V. HOLLISTBB, 761 �remaining, after deducting tue property conveyed, to pay his then existing, creditors. The leamed judge evidently came to bis conclusion in regard to the division of the proceeds of the sale of the property with some reluctancB. In the course of an able opinion he uses this language ; "Were the ques- tion to be decided for the first time, there might be some hesi- tancy in holding that a deed void as to existing creditors yf&B to be considered void as to ail creditors, for practically such is the efiect of letting in subsequent creditors, especially to share pro rata. The courts hold, with great uniformity, that the deed will not be set aside at the instance of subsequent creditors; yet they give to the latter the same benefit where the prior creditors cause it to be set aside. Why such dis- crimination as to the right to attack the deed,where there is not as to sharing in the results ?" �The decisions of which the leamed judge writes arose tmder the statute of 13 Eliz. c, 5, or statutes which are sub- etantially copies of that statute. The Missouri statute, § 2, is substantially a copy of 13 Elizabeth. The first section of the Kentueky statute is substantially a re-enactment of 13 Elizabeth. The second section of the Kentueky statute gives a legislative construction to the first section as to voluntary conveyances and existing debts, or more properly it is an addi- tional enactment. Under the second section, a gift, convey- anee, assignment, transfer, or charge of a debtor's estate, made without valuable consideration, shall be void as to his «xisting creditors ; "and, though adjudged to be void as to a prior crediter, it shall not, therefore, be deemed to be void as to subsequent creditors." �The statute of 13 Eliz. c. 5, was enacted to prevent gifts, conveyances, etc., by a debtor, with the "intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions," etc. The second section of the Kentueky statute does not require an "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud cred- itors;" but voluntary conveyances, as to existing debts, are Toid without regard to intent. �If such conveyances are void with the intent to hinder, ����