Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/586

 574 E'ËDSBAL BEFOBT£a« �render judgments upon, such reports, as the statutes do not give the power in express terms. But it seems to be well set- tled that such power exists as incident to ail courts in which trials of fact may be had. Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581 ; Lumber Co. v. Brechtel, 101 U. S. 633. The action is assump- sit upon two promissory notes, indorsed with others by the defendant for the accommodation of William H. Dickinson, both of New York, to William Dickinson, of Massachusetts, for whose benefit this suit is brought, in successive renewal of other notes upon which the defendant was accommodation indorser or surety for William H. Dickinson, ail of which were dated and signed and indorsed at New York, and some of them made payable there and sent to William Dickinson in Massachusetts, and discounted there by him, some at 12 per cent, interest, and the avails forwarded to the defendant and used for William H. Dickinson at New York. The notes were secured by corporation stock transferred by William H. Dickinson to William Dickinson, and by him to relatives, tO avoid liability as a stockholder, knowing that the defendant was a mere accommodation indorser or surety. Two princi- pal questions arise upon these facts. One is whether the law of New York which forfeited notes for usury, or that of Massa- chusetts which at that time forfeited three times the amount of unlawful interest, should govern; and the other is as to what the effect of that disposition of the stock was upon the liability of the defendant. �Upon the first question it is apparent that the notes did not become operative until they were delivered to and ac- cepted by William Dickinson, which was in Massachusetts. The eontracts evidenced by them were made in that jurisdic- tion. The interest reserved upon the discount of the notes was taken there. As to what the rate of interest shall be where a note is made at a place where the law provides one rate, and it is payable at another place where the law pro- vides a different rate, and ail other questions arising ont of which law the parties are presumed to have intended to con- traet with respect to, there seems to be no fair question but what the law of the place of payment ia to govern. The ����