Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/486

 4T4 FEDERAL REPORTER. �equity, it bas it-as a court of equity possessing nll the dis- tinctive powers belonging to such a court. When once ao- quiring and taking jurisdiction of a cause in equity by virtue of the constitution and laws of the United States, it then beeomes, as to the parties actually before it, clotbed with the full jurisdiction of a court of equity, unaffected by the geo' graphieal limitations wbich controlled in its original acqui- sition of the cause. Its jurisdiction once properly acquired over the parties properly before it, that jurisdiction then beeomes that of a court of equity proper, and extends to embrace ail acts wbich it is proper for a court of equity to perform in the cause before it; for where a court tff equity has gained jurisdiction of a cause for one purpose, it may retain it generally for relief, such as a court of equity may properly grant in the ordinary exercise of its authority. Armstrong v. Gilchrist, 2 John. Cases, 424; Russell v. Clarke's Ex'rs, 7 Cranch, 69, Among these it is a cardinal principle that a court of equity not only may but sbould do complete justice as between ail parties before it, giving to eaeh party the redress which ex equo et bono belongs to him, rather than com- pelling him to go eut into another forum for their establish- ment, or to bring a new suit before itself for a redress which itself ought to afford in the preceding suit. See Mitford's Pleadings, 164, where Lord Eedesdale speaks of this as a car- dinal rule of equity, from which most of the rules in equity concerning parties to suits spring. See, also, Story's Eq. PI. §§ 72, 174, 176, et seq., where it is said that a court of equity likes to do complete justice and not by halves; and that it will, on this principle, bring in the party who is pri- marily liable for a debt in aid of one who is only secondarily liable, in order, without further litigation, to accomplish in one suit complete justice between ail the parties, and thereby to prevent a multiplicity of suits. I think, therefore, that this court, under its general powers as a court of equity over ail parties who were properly brought before it at the beginning of the cause, may now, having been made to know by the petition of Turpin that a surety of Gordon, liable before him for the debts which Tnrpin's land was sold to pay, has become ����