Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/334

 822 FEiDEBAL BBPOBTEB. �of the trustee taldng possession of the property at once, and applying the rents in payment of the interest accruing upon the loan, Goldsmith might remain in posession while he paid the interest. The only interest or estate, then, which the de- fendant had in this property at the time of the demand, as the assignee of Goldsmith, was the possession, so long as the latter duly paid the interest accruing upon his note, and no longer. �This, then, was not an estate upon condition, and therefore it was not necessary that there should have been either an entiy or daim (demand) to avoid the estate, upon the breach of the condition, but it was an estate upon a conditional limit- ation — an agreement for the possession so long as the inter- est was paid — a possession limited by that contingency ; and as Boon as it happened the estate terminated, and the right to the possession ceased without any entry or demand upon the part of the plaintiff or his trustee. �The illustration given by Blackstone is in point : "When land is granted to a man so long as he is parson of Dale, or while he continues unmarried, or until out of the rents and profits he shall have made £500 and the like. In such case the estate determines (ceases) as soon as the contingency hap- pens." 2 Black. 155; The 60 Associates v. Howland, 11 Met. 101; Wash. E. P. 319. �The conveyance to Hewett, and the stipulation concerning liis right to the possession upon the failure to pay the note, having been made for the benefit of the plaintiff, in consider- ation of and as a security for the repayment of the money advanced by him to Goldsmith, they ought to be construed, 80 far as they are open to construction, favorably to the former, and with g} view to effect the object for which they were made. Goldsmith 's right to the possession terminated by his own act — his failure to pay the interest upon his note. Between that time and the demand by Hewett, he or his assignee was a mere tenant at will or by suffrance, and the demand of the possession was only necessary on accoTtnt of the contract to that effeot, and to enable the trustee to maintain an action for the same in case it was refused. In ����