Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/307

 eWAI7 V. BOBIKSOK. 295 �facts as to induce a reasonable belief of his Settor's insolv- ency in order to invalidate a security taken for his debts." ' �This court sees nothing irroconcilable in these cases, when we take into consideration the degree of evidence decided to be sufficient to establish a knowledge of the facts within the meaning of the bankrupt law; �Thus in In re Hauek e Co. 17 N. B. E. 158, (commenting Oli the difference between constructive and actual knowledge,) tho opinion proceeds: "Taking into consideration the adjudica- tions under section 35 prior to* said amendmentj and the cir- cumstaricea attendant on suoh amendtneût; I beiieve it to be more cbnsonant with proper judieial cOnstWicfcion to hold that said section as amended requires actûal knowledge, ^8 contradistinguished f rom constructive knowledge, to be shown. knowledge may, under certain circumstances, be properly à matter of legal presuinptien; as, for instance, when the person receiving the alleged preference isi shown to bave- actual notice of a state of facts in relation to the financiAl affairs of the banteupt constituting in law a stàte of insolv- ency. Under such cireumstances, actual knowledge would ordinarily and properly be inferred as a màtter of legal pre-, sumption. This legal presumption resta upon the principe that every person must be heM to intend the necessary and natural results of his own acts, as viewed under the law, Every one is presumed to know the law; and when a person enters into a transaction, the natural and necessary resuit of wbich is an infraction of the law, it becomes properly a matter of legal presumption that such person had actual knowledge of such unlawful resuit of hisiown act." �Under the law. as laid down in this case, which met the ap- proval of Judges Love and Dillon, (one a district and theother a circuit judge of the United States,) it is a serious question whether the complainants have not shown a case, which, if the cireumstances had transpired Bubsequent id instead of before the amendment of 1874, would not bave brought it within tbeir decision as to evidence sufficient to establish aotuàl instead of constructive knowledge. But this court does not ����
 * • * * There can be no douBt, however, that actual'