Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/306

 20e ?EDSBi,L bi:fqbtbb. �regarding "a reaaonable causa to beliôve," and contains the foUowing language: "The statute, to defeat the conveyances, does not require that the creditors should have had absolute knowledge on the point. * * ♦ It only requires that they should have had reasonable cause to believe that such was the fact, and reasonable cause they must be considered to have had, when such a state of facts was brought to their notice in respect to the affaira and pecuniary condition of the bank- rupts, as would have led prudent business men to the conclu- sion that they could not meet their obligations as they matured in the ordinary course of business." This case was foUowed by Buehanan v. Smith, 16 Wall. 308, and by Dutcher V. Wright, 94 U. S. 657, both supreme court cases, in which the same reasoning is followed in quite as strong language. In both of these cases, and in others, viz., Mer chants' Nat. Bank of Cincinnati V. Cook, 95 U. S. 346, and Wager v. Hall, 16 Wall. 601, the supreme court have decided that inability to pay debts as they matured, in the ordinary course- of business or daily transactions, constituted insolvency in the sense of the bankrupt act. �There are other decisions on the proper construction of the act of June 23, 1874, amending the bankrupt act, which, in the judgment of this court, do not govern this case, as the transactions show the subject of inquiry, as already intimated, oocurred before the passage of that act. The amendaient in question added to the words "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was inaolvent, and that such conveyance, etc., is made in fraud of the provisions of the said act," the fol- lowing, viz., "and kilew that a fraud in this act was intended." So that the evidence of knowledge, actual or cpnstruotive, was the subject of inquiry by the courts, instead of "reason- able cause to believe." �The case of Grant v. First Nat. Bank of Monmouth, 97X1. S. 80, bas been cited by the complainants and commented upon at length. The main point of this decision is that "it is not enough that a crediter has some cause to suspect the insolv- ency of his debtor, but he must bave such a knowledge of ����