Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/156

 141 FZSDESAIi BEPOBTEB. �penalty only. Bank of Satina v. Henry, 2 Den. 155; 3 Den. 593; Ourtis v. Knox, 2 Dea. 341; Barns v. Hempshall, 3e Wend, 360; 4 Hill, 468; Cloges v. Thayer, 3 Den. 56G; Parkhur.it v. Lowlen, 1 Mer, 401. �This provision of the constitution is but an adoption as a constitutional guaranty of a principle of the common law, and as a rule of the common law it was as broad as the rule in admiralty referred to, extending to cases of a mere liability to pecuniary forfeiture. Same cases, 2 Story, Com. Const. § 1788, (4th Ed.) Another point taken in support of this excep- tion is that the rule does not apply to a corporation, but only to a natural person. I see no valid reason for this distinc- tion. The property of a corporation is equally under the pro- tection of the constitution with that of a natural person. It» admission of a faot tending to criminate it would equally sub- ject it to a Judgment for a penalty or forfeiture, and thus de- prive it and its stockholders of its and their property in the same manner in which the admission of a natural person would do, and that, too, in a proceeding which for this pur- pose is qaasi criminal, and is within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and cer- tainly within the thirty-first admiralty rule. This exception is therefore overruled. �The libellant also excepts to the third article of the ànswer, which in brief sets up as a defence to the suit that the claim- ant received an oral permission to run upon excursions under Eev. St. § 4466, and to cary 600 passengers, which was more than she h ad on board, but that through negligence the per- mission was not given in writing. Eev. St. 4466 requires the permission for the extra number allowed to be in writing. Of course an unwritten permission is wholly immaterial and can- not avail a» a defence. This exception is sustained. ����