Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/155

 POLLOCK V. STEAM-BOAT LAUBA. 143 �claîmed is large, I think it ia better, in yiew of a probable appeal, that an order be entered giving tiie clairnant leave to file a Bupplemental answer, setting up the remission as a defence to the suif. �The libellant has filed exceptions to the answer of the claimant, a corporation, which appeared and defended as owner of the steam-boat. Two causes of action are stated in the libel — First, taking on board on one trip 280 passen- gers in excess of the number allowed by the certificate ; and, secondly, taking on board on another trip 275 in excess of that number. The answer, while admitting the allegadons of the libel as to the number the vessel was allowed to carry by her certificate, neither admits nor denies the allegation as to the number taken on board in excess of that number, and leaves the libellant to prove the allegations in that behalf, insisting that the claimant is not required to answer farther on the ground that its answer "might and would tend to subject it to a penalty or forfeiture." To this part of the answer the libellant excepts, and now insists that the claim- ant must admit or deny the fact alleged. I think the case is within the thirty-first admiralty rule, which is as foUows : "The defendant may object by hia answer to answer any allegation or interrogatory contained in the libel which will expose him to any prosecution or punishment for a crime, or for any penalty or any forfeiture of his property for any penal offence." It is argued that this rule is designed to protect a party against his admission of a penal offence being used against him as a party to a criminal or penal prosecution in some other suit or some other court. Possibly this was the prominent point had in view when the rule was framed, but I do not see why its tenus are nofc equally applicable to a case where, in the very same suit, the defendant called on to answer will be subjeoted to the like evil consequence of admitting the fact. In reality, this rule seems to be but an application of the provision in the constitution of the United States which provides that "no person shall be oompelled in a crim- inal case to be a witness against himself." Amend. 5. This provision applies to suits on penal statutes for a pecuniary ����