Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 5.djvu/147

 rOIiLOCK V. BTEAM-BOAT LAUEA. 135 �costs, if any there be." On the warrant of remÎBSîon the claimant now moves for a perpetuai stay of the libellant's Buit, or for otber relief. On the libellant's behalf it is ob» jected that the warrant of remission is void for want of power in the secrefcary to grant it. The section under which the warrant was issued (Kev. St. § 5294) is as follows: "The secretary of the treasary may, on application therefor, remit or mitigate any fine or penalty provided for in laws relating to steam-vessels, or discontinue any prosecution to recover penalties denounced in such laws, excepting the penalty oî imprisonment or removal from office, upon such ternis as he, in bis discretion shall think proper ; and ail rîghts granted to informers by such laws shall be held subject to the secretary's power of remission, except in cases where the daims of any informer to the share of any penalty shall bave been deter- mined bya court of competent jurisdictionprior to the appli- cation for the remission of the penalty; and the secretary shall have authority to ascertain the facts, upon ail such applications, in such manner and under such regulations as he may deem proper." This section is are-enactment, with- out any substantial change, of St. 1871, c. 100, § 64, (1(5 St. 458,) and the laws relating to steam-vessels here referred to are, or at least include, the provisions of title 52 of the Eevised Statutes, entitled "Eegulation of steam-vessels," §§ 4399 to 4500, which are substantially a re-enactment of tho statute of 1871 above refcrred to. �It is argued that the power to remit or mitigate fines and penalties here given to the secretary does not, upon a proper construction of section 5294, extend to the remission of a pen- alty given by the laws referred to, to any person suing for the same, af-er a suit therefor bas been commenaed; that this power of remission, after suit brought, does not apply at ail to the case of a penalty in which the United States is not intorested, which is the present case; and that the sub- sequent words in the statute elearly tbus restrict the power of remission granted to the secretary. The argument is that the power to remit fines and penalties is a branoh of the pardonîng power, and that a statute conferring euch power ����